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How is Progress Constructed in 
International Legal Scholarship?
Tilmann Altwicker*  and Oliver Diggelmann** 
Abstract
There is a tendency in international legal discourse to tell the story of  international law as 
a story of  progress. ‘Progress’ is a concept which is tied to the process of  secularization and 
Western 18th and 19th century philosophy. It still inspires the debate on international law 
– despite all setbacks in ‘real history’. This article argues that progress narratives in the inter-
national legal discourse are constructed by – more or less subtle – argumentative techniques. 
It highlights four such techniques – four ‘bundles of  arguments’ – which play a key role: 
ascending periodization, proving increasing value-orientation of  international law, detection 
of  positive trends, and paradigm shift-talk. The article offers an explanation of  why the pro-
gress argument often succeeds in international legal discourse.
Introduction
The idea of  progress is omnipresent in international legal discourse. Despite all short-
comings of  global ‘real life’, despite all deficiencies of  international law, the general out-
look on the development of  our discipline remains remarkably optimistic. This is not 
to say that scepticism of  international law has altogether vanished from the debate.1 
However, not even grave violations of  most fundamental rules of  international law seem 
to have a major impact on the belief  in the possibility of  progress. Neither open contempt 
of  international humanitarian law in countless post-colonial civil wars nor the gloomy 
uncertainty with respect to potential use of  weapons of  mass destruction is viewed as an 
expression of  the state of  the international system in general. Grave breaches of  inter-
national law are typically perceived as ‘deviant behaviour’. The conviction that there 
is progress in international law and that international law contributes to progress in a 
general sense is, on the whole, predominant and sets the tone of  discussion.
* Lecturer, University of  Basel. Email: tilmann.altwicker@unibas.ch.
** Professor for International and Constitutional Law, University of  Zurich. Email: oliver.diggelmann@rwi.
uzh.ch.
1 For a valuable differentiation between an optimistic and a sceptic school and its adherents in interna-
tional legal theory see Fassbender, ‘Optimismus und Skepsis im Völkerrechtsdenken der Gegenwart’, 65 
DÖV (2012) 41.
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Reference to progress takes many different forms in international legal scholarship.2 
The creation of  new international institutions or the elaboration of  new codifications 
is typically viewed as an instance of  progress in international law.3 Some authors refer 
to progress when they justify a specific political or research agenda,4 and some remind 
us ‘not to underestimate’ progress in international law.5 Many texts make only implicit 
references to progress, though. Some authors argue, for example, that international 
law is ‘inspired’ by the project of  the Enlightenment, without, however, justifying the 
reference.6 Their progress claim is implicit. In our view, international legal scholar-
ship cannot escape the question of  progress. We believe that the problem of  progress 
is central to our discipline, for self-conscious daily academic work and, no less, for the 
discipline’s self-perception.
Two recent studies have addressed the topic. Thomas Skouteris, in a study of  2010, 
concluded that much international legal research follows a ‘binary structure’ which 
prejudices the question of  progress.7 The formulation of  research topics such as ‘from 
fragmentation to standardization’ or ‘from absolutism to democracy’ creates a bias 
in favour of  progress. Skouteris sees the ultimate aim of  such research designs in the 
wish to keep control over the discourse.8 He claims also that the introduction of  new 
standards is per se treated as progress and that international lawyers must be regarded 
as ‘engineers’ of  progress.9 David Koller, in an article published in 2012, suggests giv-
ing up the search for ‘deep structures’ of  the international order.10 Most scholars – so 
the argument runs – seem to assume a linear development towards progress which is 
typically expressed in ‘from ... to’ research designs, such as those just mentioned. In 
Koller’s view, the changes of  international law could and should be depicted neither 
as linear progress nor as a circular development.
This article analyses how progress narratives are constructed in international legal 
scholarship and why (some) progress arguments are successful in the discourse.11 
We are interested in how progress is argued in texts of  international legal scholar-
ship and in the conditions of  success of  such arguments. Which are the typical ways 
2 T. Skouteris, The Notion of  Progress in International Law Discourse (2010), at 6 (with examples).
3 See, e.g., R.A. Miller and R.M. Bratspies (eds), Progress in International Law (2008).
4 Pair, ‘The New ICC Rule on Consolidation: Progress or Change?’, 25 Emroy Int’l L Rev (2011) 1061; 
M.  MacGarvin, Health and Environment in Europe: Progress Assessment (2010); Pfirter, ‘The Chemical 
Weapons Convention: Progress to Date’, 23 Hague Yrbk Int’l L (2011) 91.
5 D. Thürer, International Law as Progress and Prospect (2009), ii, at 1.
6 Dupuy, ‘International Law: Torn between Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization: General 
Conclusions’, 9 EJIL (1998) 278, at 284.
7 Skouteris, supra note 2, at 219.
8 Ibid., at 222‒226.
9 Ibid., at 219.
10 D. Koller, ‘… and New York and the Hague and Tokyo and Geneva and Nuremberg and … The Geographies 
of  International Law’, 23 EJIL (2012) 97.
11 Our use of  the term ‘narrative’ needs an explanatory remark. Following the historian Lawrence Stone, 
we use it as a synonym for a chronologically organized ‘story’ of  the topic of  interest with the ambition of  
coherent description. We do not use it in the sense authors working in the tradition of  post-structuralist 
philosophy do when they seek to discover underlying ‘discourse structures’. See Stone, ‘The Revival of  
Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’, 85 Past and Present (1979) 3.
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to organize arguments in such a way that international law is depicted as a story of  
progress? Why do we accept certain progress arguments? We shall distinguish, on 
the basis of  an extensive analysis of  literature, four ‘techniques’ which are employed 
in the construction of  progress narratives. We are not concerned with the question 
whether there is progress or not. We will try neither to prove nor to deny the existence 
of  progress. Our concern lies with international legal scholarship’s way of  dealing 
with progress.
Our own perspective can broadly be called constructivist. Constructivism is, of  
course, a term which lends itself  to several meanings.12 Our perspective is strongly 
influenced by key assumptions of  social constructivism which we shall outline briefly 
here. Social constructivism claims that the social reality we inhabit, including the 
international sphere, is to a large extent ‘socially constructed’; it is constructed by the 
means of  commonly shared knowledge, so-called ‘intersubjective knowledge’.13 Many 
– though not all14 – facts of  the social world are created by social practices: by speech 
acts, socialization, social learning, regimes of  truth, etc. Such practices generate, con-
firm, and change intersubjective knowledge. They have ‘constitutive effects’ on the 
social reality; they create it.15 A lot of  what we perceive or experience as ‘social facts’ 
– marriage, money, international law, etc. – is, as the founding fathers of  social con-
structivism would put it, ‘reified’ (meaning essentialized) intersubjective knowledge.16
The international legal discourse takes part in this process of  permanent construc-
tion and reconstruction of  the social reality. It is part of  the social practices which 
furnish the world we live in. It is part of  the constant struggle for the right language, 
of  the competition between speech acts which attempt to create essentialized knowl-
edge. To give an example, international lawyers who claim that human rights can 
only be universal try to create specific intersubjective knowledge.17 They try to pro-
vide it with the status of  a social fact, and they have reached their goal when the 
knowledge (or idea) is commonly shared that human rights can only be universal. In 
our perception, a constructivist world view has the advantage of  being highly sensi-
tive to the process of  ‘creating’ the intellectual world, of  the world of  ideas which 
guides us, and it understands the international lawyer as an engaged constructor 
12 For a brief  (and still incomplete) survey of  the many meanings of  the term constructivism see Karber, 
‘“Constructivism” as a Method in International Law’, 94 ASIL Proceedings (2000) 211, at n. 1. Also illu-
minating is Pouliot, ‘The Essence of  Constructivism’, 7 J Int’l Relations and Development (2004) 319.
13 A proponent of  constructivism in the field of  international relations, Stefano Guzzini, held that ‘con-
structivism … is epistemologically about the social construction of  knowledge, and ontologically about the 
construction of  social reality’: Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of  Constructivism in International Relations’, 6 
European J Int’l Relations (2000) 147, at 160 (emphasis by the authors).
14 Not all facts of  the social reality are constructed. One can distinguish, following John Searle, between 
‘brute facts’ (physical facts such as, e.g., human mortality) and ‘institutional facts’ (facts which cannot 
be appropriately described by mere reference to physical aspects but which require a human institution 
for their existence, such as, e.g., political authorities, social roles, etc). See Searle, ‘Social Ontology and the 
Philosophy of  Society’, 20 Analyse & Kritik (1998) 143, at 151.
15 See, e.g., Adler, ‘Constructivism and International Relations’, in W.  Carlsnaes et  al. (eds), Handbook of  
International Relations (2002), at 95.
16 See the classical text by P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of  Reality (1966).
17 See also J. Searle, Making the Social World. The Structure of  Human Civilization (2012), at 174.
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of  social reality. Here, we are interested in how international lawyers engage in the 
construction of  the idea of  progress.
The article proceeds as follows: section 1 traces the idea of  progress as a cultural 
and philosophical concept. Section 2 contains an analysis of  techniques employed to 
create progress narratives in international legal scholarship. We shall highlight those 
four techniques which, according to our analysis, dominate the international legal dis-
course: ascending periodization, proving increased value-orientation of  international 
law, detection of  positive trends, and paradigm shift-talk. For a progress argument to be 
successful, it relies, as we argue, on strategic, largely uncontested assumptions regard-
ing key social phenomena. Section 3 sheds light on four such strategic assumptions.
1 Progress and International Law
A What is Progress?
Progress of  international law is not amenable to proof  like empirical facts. What, then, 
is progress?18 For the purpose of  this article, we want to highlight three core elements of  
the concept. First, statements on progress entail statements of  comparison. ‘Progress’ 
is, thus, a relative concept. Development A can be qualified as progress only if  it is com-
pared with at least one other development, B. Secondly, the idea of  progress is linked 
with assessing the past. Statements on progress are always statements on how we inter-
pret the past, which meaning we attribute to it. Statements on progress are reflections on 
the past, not reflections of it. They link our view of  the past with our view of  the present 
and the future. ‘Progress’ is, thus, an interpretive scheme. Thirdly, statements on pro-
gress are never neutral. Even if  they may appear so on their surface, they express certain 
values. They are always value-based. They have their own and often hidden agenda.
B Progress in Socio-Political Contexts
The idea of  progress is used in a variety of  contexts. It is typically and intuitively 
referred to when we talk about new technologies and inventions. In this context, it 
means ‘technological innovation’. The notion is also used in fields where we would 
not necessarily expect it, for example in the fields of  art and aesthetics. Here, it has 
the meaning of  an advancement towards an ideal.19 Particularly important for our 
purpose is its use in socio-political contexts. Here, the notion is, interestingly, often 
employed without further clarification about its content.
The yardstick for measuring social or political progress is far from being clear. 
How can we assess progress of  society or even of  the human civilization in general?20 
18 For a thorough analysis of  the conceptual history see Koselleck, ‘Fortschritt’, in O. Brunnner et al. (eds), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (1975), ii, at 351.
19 For the relationship between progress and arts see M. Doorman and S. Marx, Art in Progress: A Philosophical 
Response to the End of  the Avant-Garde (2003), at 143.
20 See the so-called ‘Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Report’ of  2009: J. E. Stiglitz et al., ‘Report by the Commission on 
the Measurement of  Economic Performance and Social Progress’ (2009).
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Questions of  this kind become central when we talk about progress in the interna-
tional sphere. We may have an intuition about whether or not there is progress when 
we are confronted with a specific situation or development, but the question becomes 
terribly complicated when we need to name criteria to assess a certain development. 
Should we use Mahatma Gandhi’s yardstick according to which the civilizational stan-
dard of  a society is determined by the situation of  the weakest members? Or should the 
average level be the decisive criterion? These brief  remarks may suffice to show that 
there are many conceptions of  social progress which can claim intuitive plausibility.21
C Heritage of  the 18th and 19th Centuries
The idea of  progress in history is closely tied to Western modern thinking. The 18th 
century in particular brought about a specific constellation which is central for our 
purpose. The century was marked by fast scientific, technological, and social change 
and the demise of  the authority of  the theological world view. The religious idea that 
the course of  the world is determined by a transcendent God rapidly lost its persuasive 
power and gave way to the rise of  the modern consciousness that historical situations 
might be specific or unique. This is referred to as the ‘modern consciousness of  histo-
ricity’. The French revolution reinforced this perception. It promoted the idea that the 
world can no longer be seen as a place of  constant recurrence of  the same. The rise 
of  the consciousness of  historicity brought about new questions about the direction 
and the driving forces of  history. In this constellation, the modern concept of  progress 
arose. We shall first describe the theoretical options to deal with the question of  the 
direction of  history, which is central for our topic, and then briefly look at some par-
ticularly influential answers to the question of  history’s driving forces.
There are four possible ways of  modelling the direction of  history. Historical change 
can be interpreted as change for the better (progress), change for the worse (decline), 
as possessing no determinable direction (contingency), or as following a cyclical 
pattern. Eighteenth and 19th century philosophy of  history and also early sociol-
ogy mostly gave preference to the progress view. The German philosopher Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), for example, held that everything ‘which is 
not progressive’ is ‘not the object of  history’.22 In the time of  the Enlightenment, when 
history itself  became the object of  philosophical enquiry, there was an inclination to 
assume a ‘law of  progress’. The idea of  progress in a way filled the gap of  orienta-
tion left by the demise of  the theological world view. It took on the role of  a consol-
ing secular substitute for the abandoned theological interpretation of  the world.23 
21 On the classical distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ see Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of  Law an 
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, 21 Law & Philosophy (2002) 137, at 150.
22 Schelling, ‘Aus der “Allgemeinen Übersicht der neuesten philosophischen Literatur”’, in F.W.J. Schelling, 
Works (1958 [1797/98]), i, at 394.
23 See, e.g., the statement by the French author Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757) that it is – 
irrespective of  the reality – beneficial to imagine the future as promising. See Jauss, ‘Ästhetische Normen 
und geschichtliche Reflexion in der “Querelle des anciens et des modernes”’, in H.R. Jauss (ed.), Parallèle 
des anciens et des modernes (1964), at 21.
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Other views which denied the progress of  history also existed, but they remained, 
on the whole, views of  a minority. The old and formerly powerful idea that history 
follows a cyclical pattern, which had its adherents in almost any age, from Polybius 
(c. 200–118 B.C.) to Francesco Giuccardini (1483–1540), was no longer appealing 
against the background of  the rapid changes.24 The idea of  history as a contingent 
process also found adherents, particularly in 19th century historiography. Leopold 
von Ranke (1795–1886), for example, one of  the great historians of  the age, held 
that historical developments, as a whole, are neither progressive nor regressive.25 
He regarded history as fully contingent. The indeterminacy of  this position collided, 
however, with the predominant belief  of  the age that there are ‘laws’ of  history and 
the social world as there are laws of  nature. The fourth position – that history is 
conceived of  as a process of  decline – also found adherents, but it remained the view 
of  a minority, too.
With respect to the question of  the ‘driving forces’ of  history, a wide range of  answers 
was suggested. Many of  these answers had a great impact on Western social and polit-
ical theory in the 19th and 20th centuries.26 G.W.F. Hegel argued that nations and 
states are ‘unconscious agents’ of  progress.27 He viewed progress as a consequence 
of  the ‘law of  dialectics’. Early sociology installed grand narratives of  progress which 
influenced later generations of  social and political theorists. The works of  authors 
such as Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, and Emile Durkheim are charac-
terized by a shared belief  in the progress of  history which results from impulses such 
as an increase of  knowledge (Comte),28 class struggle (Marx),29 or division of  labour 
(Spencer, Durkheim).30
The heritage of  the 18th and 19th centuries is still alive today, despite all setbacks 
in ‘real history’.31 Competing views – for example: that there exist fatal forces result-
ing from the ‘Dialectics of  the Enlightenment’ – have always been present, but they 
never became predominant. In particular, the idea of  progress has survived, as Jürgen 
Habermas states, all disasters of  the 20th century.32 It still compensates for losses of  
purpose, coherence, and values caused by secularization. It is possibly something like 
24 The cyclical concept also found some modern adherents, such as Oswald Spengler and later proponents of  
cyclical economic theories. The view, however, did not become predominant again. See, e.g., O. Spengler, 
Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of  the West) (1918).
25 L. von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of  History (ed. G.G. Iggers and K. von Moltke, 2011 [1854]), at 21.
26 G. Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (1995), at 90.
27 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of  Right (2003 [1820]), at 373, para. 344.
28 A. Comte, Introduction to Positive Philosophy (ed. F. Ferré, 1988 [1830]).
29 See Marx, ‘A Critique of  Political Economy’, in D. McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (2nd edn, 
2000 [1859]). On Marx’s interpretation of  history see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of  History: 
A Defence (2nd edn, 2001); J. Wolff, Why Read Marx Today? (2002).
30 The work by Herbert Spencer had a significant impact on the Anglo-Saxon liberalism of  his age. Emile 
Durkheim’s sociology provided the basis for the powerful ‘Durkheim school’ in France, which influenced 
international legal scholars such as George Scelle and sociologists of  later generations such as, in particu-
lar, Talcott Parsons on whose theory Niklas Luhmann built.
31 For a contemporary manifestation see, e.g., F. Fukuyama, The End of  History and the Last Man (1992).
32 J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of  Modernity (1987).
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How is Progress Constructed in International Legal Scholarship? 431
a modern myth which is neither necessarily true nor false, but which has developed its 
‘own truth’.33 It helps to experience the world as stable.34
D Law and Progress Narratives
What is the role of  law in this development? Law is traditionally attributed a key role 
in Western progress narratives. The roots of  the strategic position of  law in society and 
conflict resolution date back beyond the Enlightenment period. Two factors deserve 
mention here. First, there is the influence of  the highly developed Roman law on the 
advancement of  Western societies and legal systems.35 Other, non-Western cultures 
were and still are less law-centred.36 The second factor contributing to the key role of  
law builds on the relationship between the individual and God in a monotheistic reli-
gion. Here, i.e., in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, strong rules and abiding by them 
play a central role. Rule-compliance is essential for the relationship between man 
and God.37 Law abidance connects man with God who turns into a punishing God if  
the rules are not observed. The role of  rule compliance in the monotheistic Christian 
religion was perfectly compatible with the law-centredness of  the Roman law-based 
Western culture.
The Enlightenment could build on this ground. Enlightenment authors elabo-
rated on the close connection between progress and law. Kant held, with far-reaching 
impact, that progress in history can only be conceived of  as ‘legal progress’.38 He sug-
gested an inextricable link between law and progress.39 Kant’s idea fits well with the 
dominant role of  law in the Western culture. It provided modern and secular support 
for what can be called the ‘law as progress’ view.40
33 R.A. Segal, Myth (2007), at 20.
34 Myths reduce complexity and have a consoling effect, but they also tend to immunize attitudes and mean-
ings against challenges by the ‘outside world’. The German philosopher Hans Blumenberg held that 
myths respond to a deep human fear in a contingent and often disconcerting world: see H. Blumenberg, 
Arbeit am Mythos (2006), at 40.
35 Wieacker, ‘The Importance of  Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western Thought’, 4 Boston 
College Int’l & Comp L Rev (1981) 257.
36 The law-centredness of  a culture is revealed, inter alia, by the significance of  legal norms for the process 
of  conflict resolution. Middle Eastern cultures, e.g., rely more on bargaining and have a greater aver-
sion to legal intervention in a conflict than law-centred Western cultures. See, e.g., Abu-Nimer, ‘Conflict 
Resolution Approaches: Western and Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities’, 55 Am J Econ and Sociology 
(1996) 35.
37 Jan Assmann states that monotheistic religions sanctify their primary texts – which contain the rules for 
a good life and the relationship with God – whereas the world ‘out there’ is downgraded: J. Assmann, Die 
mosaische Unterscheidung oder Der Preis des Monotheismus (2003), at 147.
38 Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History’, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (2nd edn, 1991 [1784]), at 
41. Kant had a specific understanding of  the notion ‘legal progress’ which got lost in the reception pro-
cess. He regarded ‘legal progress’ as progressive deployment of  natural law. See also infra sect. 3A.
39 Kant himself  never pronounced on whether or not there really is progress in history. His epistemology is 
not compatible with such ontological statements. See, in detail, infra sect. 3A.
40 Various objections can be raised against the ‘law as progress’ view. The problem of  ‘bad law’ will be dis-
cussed infra in sect. 3B. A further problem can be called the de-solidarization-by-law problem which has 
recently been described by Axel Honneth. Excessive reliance on law can go hand-in-hand with a degen-
eration of  the sense of  solidarity: A. Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit (2011), at 157–172.
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Countless works of  international law build on the idea of  ‘law as progress’. Take, for 
example, Manley O. Hudson’s classical work, Progress in International Organisations, of  
1932.41 Hudson treated the growth of  international organizations as an embodiment 
of  progress. Another more recent example is Malcolm N. Shaw’s standard treatise on 
international law. Shaw writes that in the long march of  mankind ‘from the cave to 
the computer’ the idea of  law has always played ‘a central role’.42 The central idea of  
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of  history, thus, became particularly influential in the 
international legal discourse.
2 Techniques for Constructing Progress Narratives
We shall now analyse how progress narratives are constructed in international legal 
discourse. Our analysis is based on scholarly legal texts which – explicitly or implicitly 
– deal with the problem of  development in the field of  international law.
An examination of  this literature shows that progress is argued for with the help 
of  four ‘techniques’: ascending periodization, proving increasing value-orientation of  
international law, detection of  positive trends, and paradigm shift-talk. The aim of  this 
section is to describe how progress arguments are typically organized or constructed 
in these texts. The four ‘techniques’ can be described as more or less subtle rhetori-
cal arrangements in which the progress argument is couched. The empirical basis for 
progress arguments is, as we will see, often thin. However, we are not interested in 
whether the techniques are scientifically sound. Our aim is to highlight those which 
are employed in the discourse. In our view, the success of  the progress argument 
depends neither on the technique applied to convey the message of  progress nor on 
the level of  subtlety of  the argument. The success of  progress arguments, as we argue, 
is mainly owed to the plausibility of  certain ‘strategic’ assumptions which underlie the 
argument. We shall first present the techniques and then, in section 3 below, address 
four of  these assumptions.
A Ascending Periodization
We call the first technique ‘ascending periodization’.43 Progress narratives can be cre-
ated by cutting the history of  international law into two or more periods and giving 
the most recent period the most favourable label. The technique sounds simple. The 
operation of  interest here – the creation of  a progress narrative – is not always made 
explicit. It often remains hidden, typically behind the use of  ‘established’ periods which 
tend to appear as ‘objective’ units. Established periods seem to reflect the ‘reality’ of  
41 M.O. Hudson, Progress in International Organisations (1932).
42 M.N. Shaw, International Law (3rd edn, 1994), at 1.
43 On the periodization of  the history of  international law see Diggelmann, ‘The Question of  Periodization 
of  the History of  International Law’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of  the 
History of  International Law (2012), at 997–1011; Butler, ‘Periodization and International Law’, in 
A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of  International Law (2011), at 379.
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How is Progress Constructed in International Legal Scholarship? 433
international law’s development.44 Periodizations such as ‘the era of  the Westphalian 
state system’ or the ‘interwar-period’, for example, may serve as examples. Periods, 
however, are not facts. They are suggestions to organize our knowledge of  the past, 
created on the basis of  contestable and value-based choices of  facts.45 Their aim is to 
facilitate the interpretation of  the world. They function as ‘intellectual working tools’. 
Periodizations are needed in order to make the amount of  information manageable.
The international legal discourse offers many examples of  the use of  the ‘ascend-
ing periodization’ technique. The distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ inter-
national law is illustrative. It divides the history of  international law into the periods 
‘before’ and ‘after’ the rise of  the partial ban on the use of  force. The use of  the label 
‘modern’ for the more recent period automatically downgrades the previous era to 
‘pre-modernity’, even if  it is called, somewhat more nobly, ‘classical’. The same peri-
odization technique is employed when the history of  international law is cut into the 
periods ‘law of  co-existence’, ‘law of  co-operation’, and ‘international law as a compre-
hensive blueprint for social life’, as suggested by Christian Tomuschat.46 ‘Coexistence’ 
is certainly not the worst form of  association. It suggests that there is no permanent 
war and that there exists some form of  common interest. ‘Cooperation’ is, however, 
already better, refers to a higher level of  association and rationality, while ‘law as a 
blueprint for social life’ refers to an even more advanced level. A further, rather blunt 
but telling example is the distinction between the two periods ‘Out of  the Mists’ and 
‘Into Clear View’ suggested by Douglas M. Johnston.47 The author justifies this peri-
odization by arguing that humanity is capable of  learning from the past.
A variant of  the technique is the use of  the dichotomy old/new. Old/new vocabu-
lary sounds unambitious and less freighted with contested notions than other dichot-
omies such as modern/classical or modern/pre-modern. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for 
example, employs the old/new dichotomy in her seminal work, A New World Order. 
There, she elaborates on the idea of  ‘disaggregated states’ which she regards as typical 
for the new order.48 She holds that the ‘old model’ of  the international system assumes 
unitary states – negotiating formal legal agreements with one another – whereas the 
‘new model’ is characterized by intensive interactions of  government officials who 
adopt codes of  best practices and work on coordinated solutions to common prob-
lems.49 We are not interested in the accuracy of  the description here. The point of  
interest is the use of  the old/new dichotomy. In principle, she does the same as the 
authors who employ the modern/classical distinction. She suggests a periodization of  
international law – the time axis is cut into the eras of  the old and the new model – and 
44 Established periods owe their privileged status to the fact that they have proved meaningful as timeframes 
for historiographical work for a relatively long time: Diggelmann, supra note 43, at 999–1001.
45 The German historian Johann Gustav Droysen stated that in history there are no epochs as there are 
no lines on the Equator and on the meridian circles: J.G. Droysen, Texte zur Geschichtstheorie (1972 
[1857/58]), at 20.
46 Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of  Mankind on the Eve of  a New Century’, 281 
RdC (1999/2001) 9, at 56.
47 D.M. Johnston, The Historical Foundations of  World Order: The Tower and the Arena (2008), at 143, 321.
48 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), at 12.
49 Ibid., at 263.
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conveys the progress message by the labelling of  the periods. The operation becomes 
fully visible when we consider the alternatives. She could also speak of  the ‘era of  the 
unitary negotiating state’ and of  the ‘era of  the disaggregated state’. These labels are 
more neutral. The choice of  the dichotomy ‘old/new’ provides a clear spin to her argu-
ment. Another author employing the old/new dichotomy is Philip Allot. He describes 
‘old international law’ as the mode of  modest self-limitation, whereas ‘new interna-
tional law’ is the law of  ‘universal legislation’.50
B Proving Increasing Value-Orientation
The second technique is to ‘prove’ or to point to increasing value-orientation of  inter-
national law. Authors employing this technique typically ‘scan’ documents of  inter-
national law for indications which can be interpreted as expressions of  shared ethical 
convictions.51 They are interested in value-sensitive legal materials of  all kinds – law-
making treaties, court decisions, customary law, soft law – and in treating them as 
indications of  progress or as enabling future progress. The technique builds on the 
idea that value-oriented international law is ‘better’ law than a morally (seemingly) 
neutral law. The idea gains plausibility against the background of  the experiences 
with a value-neutral understanding of  law in the World War II era. The technique is 
not necessarily linked with explicit claims of  progress. Such claims are implied in the 
undertaking as such, in the tonality or in the omission of  counter-evidence.
One can distinguish two main variants of  the technique (which are often combined 
though). Some authors base their progress argument on the detection of  community 
elements in international law.52 The base-line of  the argument is the idea that the 
society of  states advances towards a universal community, characterized by common 
values, goals, and interests. The quest for community elements draws on the classical 
distinction between ‘community’ and ‘society’.53 Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, 
for example, claim that nowadays there exists a ‘real’ international community with 
common values, whereas earlier the notion was used for common interests of  the pow-
erful.54 Simma and Paulus consider the shared interests to be a healthy environment, 
human rights, economic solidarity, and sustainable development. The second variant 
of  the technique to argue for progress by proving increasing value-orientation is to 
point to the expansion of  human rights. Human rights are treated as universal ethical 
imperatives whose expansion means progress. Authors employing this approach typi-
cally list a number of  important human rights instruments, starting with the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights all the way to the latest convention, and they point to 
the increasing influence of  human rights in fields formerly unrelated to human rights 
50 Allot, ‘The Emerging Universal Legal System’, 12 Int’l L Forum du Droit International (2001) 15, at 16.
51 See, e.g., Thürer, ‘Modernes Völkerrecht: Ein System im Wandel und Wachstum – Gerechtigkeitsgedanken 
als Kraft der Veränderung?’, in D. Thürer, Völkerrecht als Fortschritt und Chance (2009), at 29.
52 For the development and cultural roots of  the community-concept see Vogl, ‘Einleitung’, in J. Vogel (ed.), 
Gemeinschaften: Positionen zu einer Philosophie des Politischen (1994), at 7.
53 F. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society (2001 [1887]).
54 Simma and Paulus, ‘The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of  Globalization’, 9 EJIL 
(1998) 266, at 272.
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or to an expansion in the list of  protected rights.55 International economic law and the 
law of  diplomatic relations, for example, are depicted as evolving from human rights-
neutral fields of  international law to human rights-sensitive areas.56
C Detection of  Positive Trends
The third technique can be called the ‘detection of  positive trends’ technique. It creates 
progress narratives ‘out of  the present’, out of  current or very recent developments 
and events. Authors employing the technique treat the trends they detect as if  they 
were reliable forerunners of  important general developments. The technique employs 
a relatively modest vocabulary. ‘Trend-talk’ is not overly pretentious, it creates an 
atmosphere of  the provisional and correctable, appears open to new developments, 
and avoids speculation about ultimate finalities and objective truths. ‘Trend-talk’ is a 
soft and elegant way of  creating promising prospects of  the future. The vocabulary is 
borrowed from the discipline of  ‘future studies’ which aims to make predictions on the 
basis of  sociological and economic data.57
The technique has become remarkably popular in the international legal discourse. 
A  few examples shall illustrate this. The UN Department of  Economic and Social 
Affairs, for example, holds that there is a ‘growing and positive trend’ in international 
law and practice to extend the principle of  self-determination to peoples and groups 
within existing states.58 The statement combines a trend-claim with a notion we spon-
taneously associate with progress: the principle of  self-determination of  peoples. An 
atmosphere of  general progress is created, without being overly explicit. Let us look at 
a second example. Walter Kälin, former Representative of  the Secretary-General on the 
human rights of  internally displaced persons, observes an ‘increasing trend’ to crimi-
nalize the most atrocious forms of  arbitrary displacement.59 From our perspective, it 
is worth noting that Kälin does not talk about individual developments and events. 
Instead, he asserts a trend which is a more demanding statement. It includes a mod-
estly and provisionally formulated claim about the future. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
to add a further example, recognizes a ‘trend’ towards judicialization of  dispute settle-
ment methods in international economic law.60 He foreshadows a judicialized future 
of  the international system in general – the vision of  many international lawyers. 
Trend-statements always reach beyond the evidence gathered.
55 See, generally, for the impact of  human rights on international legal discourse Teitel, ‘Humanity’s Law: 
Rule of  Law for the New Global Politics’, 35 Cornell Int’l LJ (2002) 355.
56 See, e.g., Hilpold, ‘WTO Law and Human Rights’, 10 Chinese J Int’l L (2011) 323; Dugard, ‘Diplomatic 
Protection and Human Rights’, 24 Australian Yrbk Int’l L (2005) 75.
57 W. Bell, The Foundations of  Futures Studies (1997); R.A. Slaughter, Futures Beyond Dystopia: Creating Social 
Foresight (2004).
58 International Expert Group Meeting on the Convention on Biological Diversity’s International Regime 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing and Indigenous People’s Human Rights, Jan. 2007, UN Doc. PFII/2007/
WS.4/9, New York, at 30.
59 Report of  the Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of  Internally Displaced 
Persons (W. Kälin), Human Rights Council, 5 Jan. 2010, A/HRC/13/21, at para. 70.
60 Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. 
Dispute Settlement System?’, 31 NYU J Int’l L & Politics (1999) 753, at 773.
 by guest on A
ugust 10, 2014
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
436 EJIL 25 (2014), 425–444
‘Trend-talk’ has attracted considerable criticism. The critique relates to the cleavage 
between the modest language and the hidden claims. Trend-language is accused of  being 
dishonest. Neil Walker, for example, denounces ‘trend-talk’ as a manipulative rhetorical 
device which lends ‘additional gravitas’ to particular developments in order to dignify 
them and to authorize further advancement in the respective field.61 He considers state-
ments on trends, at best, as informed guesses whose nature is deliberately concealed.
D Highlighting ‘Paradigm Shifts’
The fourth technique can be labelled ‘paradigm shift-talk’.62 The origin and reception 
history of  Thomas Kuhn’s idea need not be discussed here. We concentrate on the role of  
‘paradigm shift-language’ for the present purpose. The desired result – a progress narra-
tive – is achieved by a simple operation: Two or more ‘competing paradigms’ are isolated 
to describe the development of  international law, and the recently most successful is 
given the most favourable label. The technique resembles to some extent the ‘ascending 
periodization’ technique as labelling is crucial in both. ‘Paradigm shift-talk’ has, how-
ever, the advantage of  being more flexible than the ‘ascending periodization’ technique. 
The notion of  paradigm is relatively undetermined. It can refer to a specific mode of  
association (society/community paradigms), a level of  cooperation (coexistence/coop-
eration paradigms), to specific conceptual ideas (state-centrism/anthropocentrism 
paradigms), or to specific value conceptions (particularism/universalism paradigms).
Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Delavalle, for example, suggest that the theory 
of  international law can be described as a competition between the two paradigms 
of  ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’.63 The notion of  ‘universalism’ – as ambiguous 
as it is – connotes more aspirations of  progressivity than the notion of  ‘particular-
ism’. ‘Particularism’ sounds old-fashioned in the era of  globalization. With such an 
arrangement of  arguments the story of  international legal theory can be told as a 
story of  progress – without being explicit in this respect. The technique enables us to 
tell a story of  gradual improvement of  international law and nevertheless allows the 
discussion of  ‘good’ and ‘bad’ developments. Another example is provided by Cesare 
Romano’s description of  the developments in international adjudication. Romano 
identifies a ‘shift from the consensual to the compulsory paradigm’.64 Evidently, the 
‘successful’ paradigm – ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ – implies more progressivity than 
61 Walker, ‘Making a World of  Difference? Habermas, Cosmopolitanism and the Constitutionalization of  
International Law’, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2005/17, at 10, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/3 (last visited 6 May 2014).
62 Thomas Kuhn did not identify paradigm shifts with progress. He regarded paradigms as ‘scientific per-
spectives’, connected with a specific scientific world view and as a set of  premises and questions. The 
function of  a paradigm is to relieve the scientific community from the need constantly to re-examine its 
premises, to create a stable framework facilitating everyday scientific work, which he calls ‘normal sci-
ence’, see T. Kuhn, The Structure of  Scientific Revolutions (3rd edn, 2008), at 163.
63 Von Bogdandy and Delavalle, ‘The Paradigms of  Universalism and Particularism in the Age of  
Globalisation: Western Perspectives on the Premises and Finality of  International Law’, 2 Collected 
Courses of  the Xiamen Academy of  International Law (2009), at 45.
64 Romano, ‘The Shift From the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication, 
39NYU J Int’l L & Politics (2007) 791.
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the notion of  ‘consensual jurisdiction’. ‘Compulsory jurisdiction’ is used as a sort of  
synonym for the rule of  law, and the idea of  the rule of  law – as we shall elaborate 
in section 3B – is intuitively regarded as the categorical opposite of  violence. The 
paradigm shift described by Romano elaborates on a story of  progress. A third and 
prominent example is to speak of  a paradigm shift from a ‘state-centred approach 
of  international law’ towards a ‘more inclusive international legal order’ or even an 
anthropocentric approach.65 Again, the argument plays with the intuitive contrast 
between two key notions, ‘state-centred international law’ and ‘more inclusive inter-
national legal order’. It tells a story of  success by giving the recently more successful 
paradigm the evidently more favourable label.
3 Strategic Assumptions Underlying Progress Arguments
In the previous section we showed in which forms, by which techniques, progress 
arguments are presented in international legal discourse. In this last section, we will 
argue that the success of  the progress arguments relies on several ‘strategic assump-
tions’.66 ‘Strategic assumptions’, as we understand them, can be described as widely 
accepted intersubjective knowledge with the status of  prima facie truths. They are 
commonly shared knowledge which helps to reduce the complexity of  the world. 
Such assumptions support progress claims by means of  their prima facie plausibility. 
‘Strategic assumptions’ are important but often undiscussed elements or even pillars 
of  progress arguments. To give an example, the claim that there is a ‘positive trend’ 
towards judicialization discussed in section 2C derives its plausibility from the under-
lying strategic assumption that law and violence (understood as brute force) are oppo-
sites. There are evidently good arguments for making this assumption (e.g., historical 
examples, ethical reasoning), which is why the assumption is widely accepted. The 
assumption, however, is not ‘true’ in a strict sense. There exists counter-evidence 
which is not reflected in it (e.g., that a judgment may sometimes itself  be considered 
‘cruel’ or counter-productive). The aim of  the following section is to highlight four 
particularly important strategic assumptions in progress narratives in the interna-
tional legal discourse. Our list, of  course, does not and cannot claim completeness.67
65 See, e.g., Schreuer, ‘The Waning of  the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?’, 
4 EJIL (1993) 447.
66 The question why an argument, including the progress argument, wins or loses in the international legal 
discourse is a complex issue. This article focuses on background meta-narratives which we consider partic-
ularly important with regard to the success of  progress arguments. We recognize, though, that the outcome 
– winning or losing an argument in the legal discourse – also depends on other factors such as context, cul-
ture, language, or ideology, to name a few. These factors have been analysed in, e.g., the theory of  narrative 
or theory of  ideology. The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.
67 In our view, the list of  assumptions cannot be complete for the following reason: it depends on the author 
of  a progress claim (in the form of  one of  the described techniques) which part of  widely shared inter-
subjective knowledge he uses as a ‘strategic’ assumption. Thereby, with this choice, he also works on the 
reification of  this part of  intersubjective knowledge. In our view, there cannot be a ‘theory of  progress 
assumptions’ which would allow one to draw up a complete and unchangeable list of  progress assump-
tions, as the choice of  an assumption is itself  part of  the process of  construction of  the social world.
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A Predominance of  Positive Forces in History
The first strategic assumption is the idea of  overall predominance of  positive forces in 
history. We touched upon this issue in a general fashion in section 1C where we traced 
the roots of  this idea to 18th and 19th century philosophy of  history and where we 
identified it as long-term heritage of  this era in Western thinking. We explained its 
character as modern myth in the West and pointed to the fact that it is to some extent 
‘impregnated’ against negative counter-evidence.
At this point, we focus on the specific role of  the idea of  positive forces in history 
as a strategic assumption in the international legal discourse. We consider it neces-
sary, in this context, to expose briefly the contribution of  Kant’s work to this role. It 
is particularly important for our purpose as Kantian thinking prominently influences 
international legal scholarship to this day, for instance, in the discourse on global 
constitutionalism.68 In order to understand this influence properly, we have to look 
briefly at the Kantian philosophy of  history. Kant was essentially concerned with the 
relationship between history and rationality. He argued that history can be understood 
as a rational process,69 as a process of  gradual fulfilment of  the demand for individual 
liberty and, ultimately, world peace.70 This is the so-called ‘Kantian teleology’ in his-
tory. It needs to be emphasized that Kant did not claim that history is progress. He did 
not say that there really is predominance of  positive forces in history, as the title of  
this section might suggest. Such ontological statements would have been incompat-
ible with his epistemology.71 Nevertheless – because of  the connections he explored 
between history, rationality, progress, and law – he was given the role of  a sort of  
crown witness for the idea of  progress in history. The ‘history as progress’ view was 
attributed to Kant, as was the ‘law as progress’ view as he was particularly concerned 
with the connections between law and rationality.72
The ‘Kantian teleology’ – in the form of  this vulgarized Kant interpretation – was 
particularly attractive for the discipline of  international law. It provided a secure 
ground for confidence in the positive forces and law in particular. It influenced count-
less works of  international legal scholarship in the 19th and 20th centuries which 
understood history, on the whole, as progress. German 19th century positivism, for 
example, should be understood against the background of  the consoling message of  
68 See, e.g., C. Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (2011), at 76.
69 See Kant, supra note 38, at 47.
70 Kant regarded the advancement of  individual liberty and, ultimately, world peace as a consequence of  
man’s anthropological condition. He saw an antagonism at work: human beings need to come together 
in society, but at the same time they resist it and thereby threaten its stability and continued existence. 
This constellation helps to produce a law-governed society which channels the antagonistic aspects of  
man. The condition of  man leads him to develop his capacities, to accept rules and institutions that gov-
ern his ‘unsocial sociability’: see ibid., at 44.
71 Kant regarded the French Revolution as a sign of  the adequacy of  his thought on history, though.
72 This leads us to an interesting insight: Kant’s influence on the international legal discourse is – at least 
partly – due to an over- or even misinterpretation of  his work. The topics he treated and the way he com-
bined ideas predestined his thought for the role it is accorded in international legal scholarship today. He 
never ‘really’ said, however, what many of  his readers read into his remarks on the relationship between 
history and rationality.
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the ‘Kantian teleology’.73 It is perfectly in line with the idea of  the existence of  a hidden 
plan of  self-deployment of  rationality in history in the form of  law. Some authors make 
open reference to this idea. Hans Kelsen, for example – in a comment which is admit-
tedly not typical for his work in general – stated that underneath the ‘technical devel-
opment’ of  law, there is a tendency of  centralization with the ‘ultimate goal’ of  the 
emergence of  a ‘world state’.74 Kelsen is not known for historical speculation, but he 
seems to assume that there is a kind of  determinism at work which ultimately realizes 
world peace through a world state. The ‘Kantian teleology’ continued and still contin-
ues to influence international legal discourse.75 The ‘from … to’ literature, for example, 
breathes its spirit, and formulations such as ‘from Nuremberg to the International 
Criminal Court’ or ‘from Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ 
are in line with it.76 The idea is also engraved in the inclination to treat ‘bad’ devel-
opments as exceptions to positive general patterns. Also, philosophical accounts of  
global governance, such as Jürgen Habermas’ project of  a ‘political constitution for 
the pluralist world society’, rely on positive forces in international relations pointing 
to the need for deeper political integration.
Progress arguments – making use of  the techniques we described in section 2 – rely 
in one form or another on the assumption of  positive forces in history. The techniques 
do not convince ‘as such’; they themselves do not ‘justify’ the progress argument. 
Progress arguments, in our view, owe part of  their success to the fact that they can 
build silently on the widely shared assumption that – on the whole and despite all 
setbacks – positive forces are predominant in history. Progress arguments using the 
technique of  ‘ascending periodization’ seem especially to rely on this background 
assumption.
B Law and Violence as Opposites
The second strategic assumption is that law and violence are natural opposites. The 
essence of  the assumption is: law is the opposite of  violence, and violence the conse-
quence of  the absence of  law. In other words, the two phenomena are treated as if  
they were categorically distinct. There is a direct line from this idea to the idea that 
juridification is automatically associated with progress.
The assumption is fuelled by many classical works of  the liberal tradition of  political 
philosophy.77 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, to name just two, both argued that it 
73 See, e.g., J.C. Bluntschli, Das Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (1868), which is 
based on German 19th century positivism’s belief  in the civilizing and progressive character of  positive 
law. The work traces the idea to contemporary international law as if  it were a coherent system. It became 
the standard treatise of  the late 19th century on international law.
74 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of  Law (2002 [1960]), at 328.
75 Koskenniemi, ‘On the Idea and Practice of  Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in 
B. Puri et al. (eds), Terror, Peace, and Universalism: Essays on the Philosophy of  Immanuel Kant (2006), 
at 3, 122.
76 Koller, supra note 10, at 99, n. 2; at 100, n. 6.
77 See Collins, ‘Constitutionalism as Liberal-Juridical Consciousness: Echoes from International-Law’s Past’, 
22 Leiden J Int’l L (2009) 251, at 253.
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is positive law which protects man from the violence of  the state of  nature,78 and the 
assumption indeed expresses some evident truth. However, it suffers from blind spots 
which are of  interest here. There is the grave problem of  ‘bad law’. Law can be the 
cause of  violence, and interpretations of  law can be elaborated justifications for brute 
force.79 The uti possidetis principle, for example, which was the guiding principle for the 
determination of  borders in the decolonization process, caused a number of  violent 
conflicts.80 The ius ad bellum of  the pre-World War I era contributed to a climate prone 
to military proliferation and war.81 Martti Koskenniemi underscores this blind spot of  
the ‘law as progress’ view and asserts that it is hardly possible to believe that inter-
national law is automatically or necessarily an instrument of  progress; international 
law, he writes, provides resources ‘for defending good and bad causes, enlightened and 
regressive policies’.82 To put it another way, law can, as Jacques Derrida pointed out, 
itself  be a form of  violence.83
In international legal scholarship, we encounter the assumption in a variety of  
ex- and implicit, of  subtle and raw forms. We find, for example, widely accepted for-
mulations such as ‘peace through law’84 or ‘speaking law to power’.85 Both play with 
the dualism law/violence; they regard law as the natural remedy for violence. More 
implicit use of  it is made, for example, when the expansion of  international law is 
treated as a welcome development.86 The discourse on global constitutionalism is a 
pointed example. It has a tendency to expect progress from pushing back power poli-
tics in favour of  legal solutions.87
Progress arguments made with the help of  the techniques we described in section 
2 rely on this assumption when they treat the expansion of  the regulatory reach of  
international law per se as progress – regardless of  its content. The claim of  a paradigm 
shift from ‘consensual’ to ‘compulsory’ adjudication in international legal dispute 
78 For Hobbes, state-institutionalized law is the solution to the problem which results from a decentralized 
right of  the individual to resort to physical force to defend himself; for Locke positive law protects man’s 
‘natural rights’. See W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (1996).
79 R.M. Cover states that interpretation – especially by courts – is a social practice which often leaves behind 
victims whose lives have been violently interfered with: Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, 95 Yale LJ (1986) 
1601.
80 Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of  New States’, 90 AJIL (1996) 590.
81 J.T. Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of  War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (1981).
82 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of  International Legal Argument (2005), at 613.
83 Derrida, ‘Force of  Law’, in D. Cornell et al. (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of  Justice (1992), at 3.
84 H. Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944).
85 Kahn, ‘Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order’, 
1 Chicago J Int´l L (2000) 1; Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human 
Rights’, 14 EJIL (2003) 241; Koh, ‘Is there a Role for Law in a World Ruled by Power?’, in H. Hestermeyer 
(ed.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (2012), ii, 1235.
86 That the expansion of  international law is, in principle, a positive development is a thread underlying the 
ILC Report on Fragmentation: see Study Group of  the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of  International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of  International Law, 58th Sess., 1 May–9 
June, 3 July–11 Aug. 2006, P 9, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr. 2006).
87 Peters, ‘The Merits of  Global Constitutionalism’, 16 Indiana J Global Legal Studies (2009) 397, at 407, 
esp. 409 (arguing that the ‘constitutionalist agenda’ is not to minimize international politics but to for-
mulate a reasonable alternative to ‘power politics’).
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settlement is an example. The focus is exclusively on the law’s regulatory ambition 
and treats its increase per se as progress.
C Rationality through Institutionalization
The third strategic assumption is that a higher level of  organization of  the interna-
tional system automatically increases its rationality. It is obviously closely related to 
the second assumption of  law and violence as natural opposites, even if  the two do not 
coincide. The catchphrase for the essence of  this assumption is ‘rationality through 
institutionalization’.
Institutionalization in this sense can take many forms. There are formal ways of  
institutionalization, typically through law and hierarchies, and informal ways, for 
example in administrative networks.88 The call for higher levels of  organization and 
more institutions is omnipresent in the international legal discourse, as anyone 
familiar with international legal literature knows. The view is based on the belief  
that international institutions are in a privileged position to advance community 
interests and produce efficiency gains.89 The classic example is the foundation of  
the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1874.90 Institutionalization in this case solved 
the problem of  international mail. States have an interest that mail can be sent 
from one country to another, but they have to make sure that services in both the 
originating and the destination country are paid for. The solution is that all inter-
national mail requires the stamps only of  the originating country. The destination 
country waives compensation, but keeps the payment in the cases in which it is 
itself  the originating country. The efficiency gains in the example of  the Universal 
Postal Union are evident. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore hold even that 
there is a sort of  ‘normative bias in favor of  international organizations’.91 They 
help states cooperate and peoples overcome oppressive governments, spread good 
norms, and articulate a spirit of  progress and enlightenment. In the liberal per-
spective, international organizations are viewed as essential for progress. There is, 
however, growing criticism. Cooperation in international institutions often suf-
fers from significant deficits.92 Fragmentation of  international law – lack of  for-
mal coordination and hierarchy among different functional institutions and their 
88 For an overview see Simmons and Martin, ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in Carlsnaes 
et al. (eds), supra note 15, at 192. The following articles are considered classics: Kehoane, ‘International 
Institutions: Two Approaches’, 32 Int’l Studies Q (1988) 379; Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchic World’, 36 Int’l Org (1982) 299; Abbott and Snidal, ‘Why States Act through 
Formal International Organizations’, 42 J Conflict Resolution (1998) 3. On international administrative 
networks see Slaughter, supra note 48.
89 See, generally, A. Guzman, How International Law Works (2008), at 121–129.
90 See Guzman, ‘Against Consent’, 52 Virginia J Int’l L (2012) 747, at 756.
91 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (2004), at ix.
92 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation 
of  Global Law’, 25 Michigan J Int’l L (2003–2004) 999; Kaiser, ‘Coordination of  International 
Organizations – Intellectual Property as an Example: Can There Be Safety in Numbers?’, in Miller and 
Bratspies (eds), supra note 3, at 315.
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normative systems – is a source of  serious problems.93 The international order suf-
fers from a lack of  efficiency due to ambiguous boundaries and overlapping activi-
ties of  international institutions.94 As a matter of  fact, the current system with its 
many overlapping regimes entails high transaction costs for international legal bod-
ies which must try to reintegrate or ra tionalize the legal order. Just take the endless 
debate on the relationship between actions of  the UN Security Council and human 
rights, generally known as the ‘Kadi debate’.95 Armin von Bogdandy observes that 
nowadays many ‘acknowledge that more international law and more international 
institutions are not always the answer, but may ... be part of  the problem’.96 Eyal 
Benvenisti and George W. Downs argue even that fragmentation is an obstacle to a 
more egalitarian international system.97
The rationality through institutionalization assumption regularly underlies pro-
gress arguments employing the technique of  ‘ascending periodization’: For example, 
the progressivity of  international law after World War I is often alluded to by reference 
to the increase in the degree of  institutionalization.
D Progressive Language Contributes to Progress
The fourth strategic assumption is that language is a central means of  creating pro-
gress. The essence of  this assumption is that suggestions of  new doctrinal ideas, con-
cepts, or methods are often based on the belief  that language is a key means to shape 
and pre-structure ‘reality’. As outlined in the introduction, this assumption is fully in 
line with the social constructivist position to which we subscribe.
Many authors treat language as a key instrument to shape and change ‘reality’. 
Take, for example, the famous book, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management 
in Africa, edited by Francis Deng and published in 1996.98 It was an attempt to re-
define, to reshape the concept of  sovereignty. It triggered a development which led to 
the formulation of  the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ which is about to transform the con-
cept of  state sovereignty, at least to some extent. Another example is the rise of  the 
notion ‘soft law’. The attempts to establish and promote the concept of  ‘soft law’ can 
be understood as attempts to broaden the reach of  the international legal discourse. 
Non-binding rules could now be treated as ‘quasi-legal rules’ or ‘not yet law’.99 A third 
93 Fragmentation is the consequence of  the lack of  unity of  international law. In H.L.A. Hart’s terminology, 
there is no international rule of  recognition. For Hart international law, therefore, is not a ‘system’, but 
a ‘set’ of  rules: see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of  Law (1998), at 234. From the vast literature on the prob-
lem of  fragmentation see Koskenniemi and Leino, ‘Fragmentation of  International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties’, 15 Leiden J Int’l L (2002) 553.
94 Ibid., at 595.
95 See, e.g., Diggelmann, ‘Targeted Sanctions und Menschenrechte. Reflexionen zu einem ungeklärten 
Verhältnis’, 17 Swiss Rev Int’l & European L (2009) 301.
96 Von Bogdandy, Book Review of  Emmanuelle Jouannet, Hélène Ruiz Fabri, and Jean-Marc Sorel (eds), 
Regards d’une génération sur le Droit International, 20 EJIL (2009) 919, at 920.
97 Benvenisti and Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of  
International Law’, 60 Standford L Rev (2007) 595, at 599.
98 F. Deng (ed.), Sovereignty as Responsibility (1996).
99 On ‘soft law’ and the increase of  fields of  activity for international lawyers see d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in 
International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials’, 19 EJIL (2008) 1075, at 1088.
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example is the concept of  the ‘constitutional treaty’ which was designed, but ultimately 
discarded, as the document founding the European Union legal order. As Jürgen Bast 
has argued, the coupling of  ‘constitution’ and ‘treaty’ had the effect of  creating a ‘not 
yet rationale’.100 Political sectors of  EU law which the ‘constitutional treaty’ had not 
yet subjected to the ‘community method’ (which, inter alia, relates to lawmaking and 
enforcement powers) were thereby placed under pressure and the expectation also to 
subscribe to the progressiveness of  the standard ‘community method’.101 The ex ample 
of  the ‘constitutional treaty’ shows that language – in this case the concept of  a 
‘constitution’ – is considered to be able to imbue a present state of  legal affairs with 
a progressive ‘spin’. ‘Avant-garde’ movements typically employ new ‘avant-garde’ lan-
guage with the ambition thereby to alter our perception of  the world. The assumption 
is that the struggle for the ‘right terminology’ is also a struggle for the ‘right reality’. 
Global constitutionalism is an approach which typically works with this assumption. 
It can be seen as an attempt to challenge and gradually replace traditional concepts of  
international law and to establish a new view on international relations.102 It typically 
seeks to replace sovereignty-based understandings of  international law with a new 
understanding which challenges many ‘classic’ institutions of  international law, such 
as state immunity and consensus-based law-making etc. Constitutionalist language is 
biased language which gives preference to ‘new’ institutions such as, for example, indi-
vidual criminal responsibility and a strengthened role for international ius cogens.103 
To expect progress from using progressive language seems, in general, a widely made 
assumption which also fuels projects such as ‘global administrative law’.104
The assumption that progressive language contributes to progress is arguably the most 
central assumption in progress arguments on international law. In our view, the eminent 
role of  progressive language in accounts of  progress cannot be overestimated. Progress is 
‘created’ in a strong sense of  the term when a progressive label is assigned to the present 
period of  international law (‘ascending periodization’). The more the language of  human 
rights is engraved in international documents, the more easily the progress argument rely-
ing on increased value-orientation will be made. The same is true for the techniques which 
convey the progress argument by pointing to positive trends or paradigm shifts. These 
trends and paradigm shifts are ‘made’ and confirmed by employing progressive language. 
In this way, progressive language stabilizes progress narratives and reifies progress.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we analysed how progress is constructed in international legal scholar-
ship and why these constructions are (sometimes) successful. We argued that there is 
100 Bast, ‘The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution’, 6 German LJ (2005) 1433.
101 Ibid., at 1450‒1451.
102 Diggelmann and Altwicker, ‘Is There Something Like a Constitution of  International Law? A  Critical 
Analysis of  the Debate on World Constitutionalism’, 68 ZaöRV (2008) 623, at 645‒646.
103 Ibid.
104 See, prominently, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of  Global Administrative Law’, 68 L & 
Contemporary Probs (2005) 15.
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a bundle of  established and accepted ‘techniques’ in the international legal discourse 
to create progress narratives, and we described four such techniques in detail: ascend-
ing periodization, proving increased value-orientation of  international law, trend-
talk and the paradigm shift technique. We showed how these techniques fit into the 
Western tradition of  thinking. The intellectual roots of  these techniques can be found 
in 18th and 19th century Western thinking and in the Western topos that law plays 
a key role in progress. We argued that the success of  progress arguments is neither 
due to (contestable) empirical findings, nor due to the application of  the – more or less 
subtle – techniques to convey the message of  progress of  international law. Instead, 
the success of  progress arguments relies on strategic assumptions about key social 
phenomena (such as ‘law’ or ‘institutions’). These assumptions, too, are well rooted in 
Western philosophical thought.
In our view, the inclination to create and accept progress narratives of  interna-
tional law has become more intense in the last decade. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
international legal theory seemed more concerned with critical thought than today. 
The discipline faced the challenges of  deconstructivism and the critiques inspired by 
feminist and Marxist thought. Applying the ideas and concepts of  the critical legal 
studies movement to international law was en vogue. In other words, the discipline 
seemed more inclined to deal with inconvenient questions. Meanwhile – even though 
hardly any of  these critical approaches would claim that their mission has been com-
pleted – the critical approaches lost ground.
We doubt that this is due to a significantly better state of  world affairs. We regard it 
mainly as the result of  the long-persistent influence of  the described heritage of  18th 
and 19th century philosophical thought which has in a way impregnated Western 
thinking and therefore survives less long-living intellectual trends.
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